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GREEDY LOSS PREVENTION: insurance and warranties 
 
Abstract 
In three studies, we show that loss aversion is essential to greed, in addition to acquisitive 
behavior. This drives them towards paying for insurances and warranties to avoid future 
financial or product loss. Furthermore, when they experience a history of no-losses, it limits 
their purchase likelihood of insurances. 
Economic greed 
Greed is omnipresent in our current society and highly relevant to economics. For instance, 
the media and public opinion attributed the financial crisis to the greediness of bankers and 
stockbrokers, who risked clients’ money to ensure greater turnover to satisfy their greed 
(Papatheodorou, Rosselló, and Xiao 2010).Greed has also been related to corporate fraud 
(Smith 2003) resulting in the downfall of international corporations (Wells 2011). On a 
smaller scale individual greed is shown to be associated with higher debts (Lunt and 
Livingstone 1991).  
Scientific research has caught up with this renewed focus on greed in society, making it a 
central concept in economical research. Greed is often invoked to explain non-cooperative 
behavior in economic games (Stanley and Tran 1998), resource exploitation (Ludwig, 
Hilborn, and Walters 1993) and is considered intrinsic to a materialistic lifestyle (Belk 1985). 
In this paper, based on previous work (Krekels, Pandelaere, and Weijters 2013; Seuntjens, 
Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, and van de Ven 2013; Wang and Murnighan 2011) we will focus 
on dispositional greed, defined as a personality trait that entails an insatiable, self-centered 
desire for more, whether of monetary or nonmonetary items. 
Dual vision on greed 
When people think about the concept of greed as defined above, they typically focus on 
acquisitive behavior (Wachtel 2003), classifying greed as a type of wanting more behavior. 
Though we endorse this wanting more perspective of greed, an important aspect is missing 
from prior conceptualizations. More specifically, avoiding losses might be another important 
characteristic of greedy people. Preventing that one loses certain items could be an essential 
part of attaining as much as possible.  
Regulatory focus (Higgins 1997) nicely fits this dual vision on greed as a motivational 
principle. Regulatory focus theory elicits two different motivations, one focused on 
approaching positive or desired outcomes and one on avoiding negative or undesired 
outcomes.Where a promotion focus is concerned with attaining gains, advancement and 
accomplishment, a prevention focus is concerned with avoiding losses, safety and protection. 
This coincides with a twofoldmotivation within greed: greedy promotion is oriented towards 
attaining as much as possible of desired objects, whereas greedy prevention is oriented 
  
towards not losing what one has already attained.We posit both to be essential in a greedy 
motivation. 
This dual vision on greed is often indirectly incorporated in research, where the same 
uncooperative behavior might be explained by preventing losses in pay-offs, labeled fear, or 
increasing pay-offs, labeled greed (Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989). We believe that both 
these labels are an essential part of dispositional greed. Thus, using a newly developed 
dispositional greed scale (Krekels et al. 2013), we first examined whether a greedy motivation 
can be driven by a prevention focus as well as a promotion focus.An initial study (N = 184, 91 
men, M age = 30.9, SD = 11.8) indeed indicates a positive correlation between dispositional 
greed (table 1) and both a promotion and prevention focus (Grant and Higgins 2003) (r = .25 
and .26, p < .001). 
Insurance policies and warranties 
Although a theoretical understanding of the dual promotion and prevention motivation in 
dispositional greed are relevant and useful, in this paper we will mainly focus on the effects of 
a prevention motivation on everyday consumer behavior. The reasons for this focus are 
twofold. First, the effects of a promotion orientation seem more straightforward, as they align 
with a lay definition of greed as wanting more behavior. Second, though greed has mainly 
been conceptualized as a societal problem with excesses in big international businesses, we 
believe that small scale effects of a greedy disposition have a bigger effect on everyday life. 
More specifically, as a prevention orientation is mainly focused on safety and protection 
(Higgins 1997, 1998), in this paper we will examine the effect of a greedy disposition and its 
inherent prevention orientation on the purchase of insurance policies and warranties.  
Under a prevention focus, people are more sensitive to losses and thus use avoidance 
strategies whenever possible to avoid negative outcomes. One industry that is primarily 
associated with protective mechanisms against possible losses and negative outcomes is that 
of insurance companies and warranties. By definition the purpose of insurance companies is 
to protect people from suffering potential negative outcomes of certain events. They can be 
regarded as vaccines in the non-biological environment: both are pre-emptive strategies 
against negative outcomes which do not prevent situations from happening but from having 
any resulting effects. Indeed, insurances and vaccines are often used in regulatory focus 
research (e.g. Kluger et al. 2004; Wiener, Gentry, and Miller 1986).  
Similarly, extended service contract warranties can protect customers from losses.  As 
product quality is not directly observable by customers and there exists a potential but 
undeterminable risk of product failure, buying a warranty diminishes the financial risk of a 
purchase (Shimp and Bearden 1982) through diminishing the effects of damages and assuring 
that the product will perform to expectations (Loveland 2010). Indeed, both warranties and 
insurances can be purchased as a means to minimize the effects of a problem should it occur. 
Thus, we expect dispositional greedy people to be more likely to purchase warranties and 
insurances to avoid losses, as it corresponds to their preventive motive (Liberman et al. 1999) 
and does not contrast their promotion motive.  
In four studies we show that preventing losses is not only an essential part of a greedy 
disposition, but indicate that this motivation effects consumer decision making with respect to 
buying and paying for insurances and warranties. This contributes not only to a theoretical 
understanding of greed, but also to its relevance for consumer behavior research. 
Study 1: Loss aversion 
  
As both prevention and promotion correlated equally strong in the aforementioned pre-test, 
we study loss aversion to examine the impact of one compared to the other. If the promotion 
orientation is stronger than the prevention orientation in greedy people, we expect low scores 
for loss aversion. However, if the promotion orientation would be weaker, we expect higher 
scores. 
To test which of both motivations is stronger, we employed the method of Tom, Fox, 
Trepel, and Poldrack (2007), where respondents indicate their willingness to participate in a 
coin toss gamble with an equal 50%-50% chance of winning (10 - 45€, increments of 5€) or 
losing (5 - 25€, increments of 2.5€). These amounts were chosen as previous studies indicated 
people are roughly twice as sensitive to losses as they are to gains (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992). Important to note here is that this test examines the effect of prevention versus 
promotion orientation, not that of loss aversion versus gain preference. 152 Students (102 
men, M age = 21.1, SD = 2.7) participated in 66 randomized trials. These trails were divided 
in three tasks, interspersed with unrelated tasks to avoid answering fatigue and random 
answering. After another unrelated tasks they answered several psychological measures, 
amongst which the Dispositional Greed Scale (Krekels et al. 2013). 
Linear regression showed that dispositional greed predicted respondents’ loss aversion 
(table 2). Greedy people (+1SD) exhibitan average loss aversion ratio of 5.62 (SD = .59), 
indicating them to need on average more than 5 times the amount of gain versus loss to 
participate in the coin toss gamble. For non-greedy people (-1SD) this ratio is 3.82 (SD = .59). 
This shows that greedy people are not only oriented towards gaining more, but are also 
focused on preventing losses, and when balancing both, loss prevention is the more powerfull 
motivation. 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert table 1 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
Study 2: insurances and warranties 
The second study wanted to test the effect of greedy people’s prevention orientation on real 
life behavior, more specifically on their preferences for buying insurances and warranties. As 
stated previously, buying an insurance or extended warranty is a way to cope with the 
possibility of loosing or damaging the product and thereby diminishing the investment made. 
Indeed, risk aversion and prevention have often been cited as the cornerstone for the decision 
to invest in an insurance policy or extended warranty (Loveland 2010). In essence, all 
potential customers will experience some degree of concern that a product will not function 
up to expectations. However, to purchase an extended warranty or insurance, the concern of 
product failure must be sufficiently high (Shimp and Bearden 1982). We propose that, as 
greed has been shown to be linked with a prevention promotion and loss aversion, the more 
greedy a customer, the more he or she will be inclined to buy a product insurance or extended 
warranty contract. 
108 MTurk participants (55 men, M age = 38.1, SD = 11.6) answered an online survey about 
product purchases, insurances and warranties. They saw three scenario’s and afterwards 
  
answered the Dispositional Greed Scale. The scenarios were chosen to represent both 
products and experiences, to be relevant for both warranties and insurances and to include 
different measurement of tendency to buy. The first scenario stated that the respondent was 
buying a smartphone, and the seller indicate that besides the limited basic warranty, they 
could buy three types of additional insurance plans. Insurance A cost 3$ a month for 1-year 
basic damages insurance, Insurance B cost 6$ a month for 1-year extended damage, loss and 
theft insurance, and Insurance C cost 8$ a month for 2-year extended damage, los and theft 
insurance. Respondents indicated whether they wanted to buy any of these insurances or none.  
The second scenario described them buying a second hand car with an expired warranty, but 
the dealer offered a 500$ 2-year warranty. Respondents indicated their purchase likelihood 
and attitude towards the extended warranty. The last scenario described a ski trip, which 
offered a ski guarantee allowing them to rebook their trip to a different date or location if ski 
conditions were poor. Respondents indicated their willingness to pay to include the guarantee, 
or indicated the price drop needed to exclude the guarantee. We predicted greed to have 
positive significant effects on the choice of insurance, the purchase likelihood and the attitude 
towards the warranty in the first two scenario’s. However, we did not expect an effect on the 
WTP measures in the third scenario, as we predicted there to be a conflict between their 
prevention motivation, that would direct them towards the ski guarantee, and their promotion 
motivation, that would direct them towards paying as little as possible. 
Linear regression showed that there was indeed no relation between respondents’ 
dispositional greed and their log-transformed WTP for the inclusion (B = .183, t (52) = 1.339, 
p = .19) or exclusion (B = -.163, t (51) = -1.179, p = .24) of the ski guarantee. Further analysis 
revealed greed to be indeed related to respondents’ choice of insurance, the purchase 
likelihood and the attitude towards the warranty, but these relations were not linear but 
quadratic following a U-shape (table 2). The more greedy the responder, the more inclined 
they were to buy the more extensive insurance, the higher their purchase likelihood and their 
attitude towards the warranty. However, really non-greedy people had the same tendencies. 
Further analysis revealed this quadratic function to not be explained by either income or age. 
It is not entirely clear what explains non-greedy people’s tendency to buy insurances or 
warranties. 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert table 2 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
 
 
Study 3: insurance after losing vs winning 
The third study wanted to test whether we could eliminate greedy people’s loss prevention. 
One possibility for lessening people’s prevention orientation is the history of success versus 
losses. Previous research (Higgins et al. 2001) has shown that recent experiences with loss or 
success can indeed change people’s current motivation. If greedy people are more aware of 
the possibility of losing certain items or money, could this be lessened by a history of non-
losses? In other words, when greedy people experience that they do not loose for a while, will 
they become less focused on preventing losses?  
  
To test this, as lab experiment was set up with 101 undergraduate students (53 men, M age = 
20.3, SD = 1.9). They were instructed in a gamble game: they would have to predict whether 
a flipped coin would land on heads or tails. Respondents were told it was a normal coin, with 
a 50% chance to land on heads and a 50% chance to land on tails, making it a random gamble 
where they had no control over the outcomes. Respondents started with a certain amount of 
points, equal to the amount of coin flip and guess trails, and were instructed to keep as many 
points as possible. If their prediction was false; for instance they predicted heads but the coin 
landed on tails, they would lose a point, called a penalty. If their prediction was correct, 
nothing would happen. The point retaining was set up to prevent people’s promotion 
orientation from influencing the experiment. Thus, people could only loose points, not gain 
them.  
Before starting the final game, respondents entered a test-game. In this game, they would 
guess five times whether a coin would fall on heads or tails. They started with five points, and 
were instructed to keep as many points as possible. However, respondents were unaware of 
the fact that they had been divided into two conditions, and that the test trials were not 
random. Half the participants were participating in the loss-trials. In these trials, the first two 
coin tosses were programmed to show the opposite of what the responder had guess, the third 
trial was programmed to be correct, and the fourth and last trial were programmed to be 
incorrect again. Thus, respondents in the loss condition made four wrong guesses, and ended 
with one out of a possible five points. Respondents in the non-loss condition experienced the 
exact opposite: first two correct guesses, than an incorrect guess, and finally two more correct 
guesses, ending with 4 out of 5 points. 
After these test trails, giving them an experience of loss or non-loss, respondents were told 
they would play the real game with 20 trials. The person scoring the highest point at the end 
would win movie tickets. This incentive was chosen to be relevant for participants and to 
ensure that they were involved in the game. Furthermore, if they wanted, they could buy a 
type of insurance against making too much incorrect guesses. There were 4 types of 
insurances, eliminating 3, 6, 9 or 12 wrong guesses. If respondents bought any of these 
insurances, at the end of the game they would be given back the maximum amount of points 
they lost corresponding to the insurance they bought. To buy these insurances, they would 
have to do a boring task (crossing every letter ‘e’ in a paper regarding a subject they could not 
understand) for a certain amount of time: 2.5 minutes for three incorrect guesses, 5 minutes 
for 6 incorrect guesses, 7.5 minutes for 9 incorrect guesses and 10 minutes for 12 incorrect 
guesses. After these instructions, respondents indicated whether they wanted to buy insurance 
and the amount of wrong guesses they thought they were going to make. In an unrelated task, 
respondents also filled out the Dispositional Greed Scale. 
We expected people in the loss condition to believe that they would make more mistakes, and 
therefor to be more inclined to buy a more extended insurance than people in the no-loss 
condition. Furthermore, we expected a quadratic relation between greed and the expectancy to 
make mistakes, and therefor to buy a more extended insurance. Finally, we expected to find 
an interaction between the condition and respondents’ greed score, so that there greed score 
would have less of an impact in the no-loss condition than in the loss-condition. 
A moderated mediation analysis partially confirmed our hypotheses. More specifically, both 
the condition (B = -.54, t (97) = -1.932, p = .06) and quadratic dispositional greed (B = .02, t 
(97) = 1.973, p = .05) were related to people’s predicted amount of mistakes. However, there 
was no interaction between both variables. Thus, greedy people indeed predicted to make 
fewer mistakes in the no-loss condition, but the effect of dispositional greed was not 
  
alleviated. Both dispositional greed and the condition only had main effects on the amount of 
mistakes predicted. This prediction was indeed further related to the amount of insurance 
people wanted to buy (B = .25, t (98) = 2.01, p > .05) (figure 1). 
 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert figure 1 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––– 
 
Conclusion 
In three studies we show that loss prevention has a big impact for greedy people in 
consumer decision making, especially towards insurances and warranties. A prevention focus 
is an essential part of dispositional greed, and has an even larger impact than the promotion 
focus, resulting in bigger loss aversion. Furthermore, when greedy people buy products, they 
are more inclined to buy an extended service contract and are more inclined to buy a more 
extensive insurance. However, they are not willing to pay more for it, as it probably contrasts 
with their promotion focus. Finally, when they are confronted with a history of non-loss, the 
effect of their willingness to prevent losses is lessened but not eliminated.  
More research is needed to explain what happens with non-greedy people. Why is it that, 
when non-greedy approach the endpoints of the scale, they are also more prone to buy 
insurances and warranties? This cannot be explained by a prevention focus, as there is a 
simple linear relation between dispositional greed and prevention. Possibly an explanation lies 
in the fact that they also score lower on materialism. Perhaps their very low greediness and 
materialism is linked to a type of anti-consumerism. If so, their inclination to buy insurances 
is a not a way to prevent losses when they occur, but an approach to prolong the lifetime of a 
product. Thereby they would have to buy and thus consume less products, corresponding to 
their lifestyle and values. Further research is needed to test this one possible explanation and 
give more insight in low-greedy people’s values and lifestyles, linked with their consumption 
patterns.  
  
  
References 
Grant Heidi and E. Tory Higgins (2003), “Optimism, promotion pride, and prevention pride 
as predictors of quality of life,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1521–32. 
Higgins, E. Tory (1997), “Beyond pleasure and pain,” American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300 
Higgins, E. Tory (1998), “Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational 
principle,” In Mark P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 30, 1-46, 
New York: Academic Press. 
Higgins, E. Tory, Ronald S. Friedman, Robert E. Harlow, Lorraine C. Idson, Ozlem N. Ayduk 
and Amy Taylor (2001), “Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: 
Promotion pride versus prevention pride,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 3–
23. 
Kluger, Avraham N., Elena Stephan, Yoav Ganzach and Meirav Hershkovitz (2004), “The 
effect of regulatory focus on the shape of probability-weighting function: Evidence from a 
cross-modality matching method,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 95 (1), 20–39 
Krekels, Goedele, Mario Pandelaere and Bert Weijters (2013), “Dispositional Greed: Scale 
Development and Validation", in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 40, ed. Zeynep 
Gürhan-Canli, Cele Otnes, Rui (Juliet) Zhu, MN : Association for Consumer Research, 
Pages: 892-93. 
Liberman, Nira, Lorraine C. Idson,  Christopher J. Camacho and E. Tory Higgins (1999), 
“Promotion and prevention choices between stability and change,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 77, 1135-45. 
Loveland, James M. (2010), “Who needs peace of mind and at what price: Extended service 
contract warranties and willingness to pay,” paper presented at the Robert Mittelstaedt 
Doctoral Symposium, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 
Ludwig, Donald, Ray Hilborn and Carl Walters (1993), “Uncertainty, resource exploitation 
and conservation: lessons from history,” Ecological Applications, 4, 548-549. 
 
Lunt, Peter K. and Sonia M. Livingstone (1991), “Everyday explanations for personal debt: A 
network approach,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 309-323. 
Papatheodorou, Andreas, Laume Rosselló and Honggen Xiao (2010), “Global Economic 
Crisis and Tourism: Consequences and Perspectives,” Journal of Travel Research, 49 (1), 
39-45. 
Rapoport, Amnon and Dalit Eshed-Levy (1989), “Provision of step-level public goods: effects 
of greed and fear of being gypped,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 44, 325–344. 
  
Seuntjens, Terri G., Marcel Zeelenberg, Seger M. Breugelmans and Niels van de Ven (2013), 
“What We Talk about When We Talk about Greed: A Prototype Analysis,” working paper, 
Tilburg University, Tilburg 
Shimp, Terrence A. and William O. Bearden (1982), "Warranty and Other Extrinsic Cue 
Effects on Consumers' Risk Perceptions," Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (June), 38-46. 
Smith, Russell G. (2003), Serious fraud in Australia and New Zealand, Canberra, AU: 
Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Stanley, Tom D. and Ume Tran (1998), “Economics Students Need Not Be Greedy: Fairness 
and the Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 27 (6), 657-64. 
Tom, Sabrina M., Craig R. Fox, Christopher Trepel and Russell A. Poldrack (2007), “The 
neural basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk,” Science, 315, 515–518. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323. 
Wachtel, Paul L. (2003), “Full Pockets, Empty Lives: A Psychoanalytic Exploration of the 
Contemporary Culture of Greed,” The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 63, 103-122. 
Wang, Long and Keith J. Murnighan (2011), “On greed,” Academy of Management Annals, 
5(1), 279-316. 
Wiener, Joshua L., James W. Gentry and Ronald K. Miller (1986), “The Framing of the 
Insurance Purchase Decision,” in Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 13, ed. Richard J. 
Lutz, UT: Association for Consumer Research, 251-256 
Wells, Joseph T. (2011), Corporate fraud handbook: Prevention and detection, Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
  
  
TABLE 1 
Study 1: Effect of Dispositional Greed on Loss Aversion 
 Beta SE t p 
Constant .18 .09 2.14 .034 
Dispositional Greed .19 .02 2.35 .020 
F (df) 5.53 (1, 151)  
R² .035 
 
TABLE 2 
Study 2: Effect of Dispositional Greed on … 
Type of insurance Beta SE t p 
Constant 3.23 .81 3.98 .000 
Dispositional Greed -.97 .46 -1.82 .071 
Dispositional Greed ² .95 .06 1.79 .076 
F (df) 1.66 (2, 102)  
R² .013 
     
Purchase likelihood Beta SE t p 
Constant 7.51 1.45 5.17 .000 
Dispositional Greed -1.22 .82 -2.34 .021 
Dispositional Greed ² 1.26 .11 2.42 .017 
F (df) 2.95 (2, 105)  
R² .035 
     
Attitude towards the 
warranty Beta SE t p 
Constant 4.91 .80 6.14 .000 
Dispositional Greed -1.06 .46 -2.06 .042 
Dispositional Greed ² 1.20 .06 2.33 .022 
F (df) 3.51 (2, 105)  
R² .045 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 1 
Study 3: Effect of Dispositional Greed and Loss History on Predicted Errors and Purchase 
Likelihood 
 
Dispositional 
Greed² 
Purchase 
likelihood 
Predicted errors 
Condition  
(0 = loss) 
3.85* 
-.54* 
.02* 
.25* 
